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Quotations and Actual Malice: Bridging
the Gap Between Fact and Fiction

Malice will not be inferred from evidence showing that the

quoted language does not contain the exact words used by the

plaintiff provided that the fabricated quotations are either

rational interpretations of ambiguous remarks made by the
public figure . . . or do not alter the substantive content of

unambiguous remarks actually made by the public figure.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir.
1989) (Alarcon, J., for the court).
*

While courts have a grave responsibility under the first
amendment to safeguard freedom of the press, the right to
deliberately alter quotations is not, in my view, a concomitant
of a free press .

..

to invoke the right to deliberately distort

what someone else has said is to assert the right to lie in print.

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1548, 1570 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
At what point does the altering or fabricating of portions of
direct quotations cross the threshold between a summary judgment in
favor of a libel' defendant and allowing the plaintiff to have his case

Following the authoring of this article, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit. As of the printing of
this article, oral arguments have been heard and a decision is expected sometime
during the Spring 1991 term.
1. Libel is a subset of defamation. Defamation is defined as: "A communication .

.

. [which] tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in

the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Libel is defined as: "the
publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in
physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially
harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 568 (1) (1977). The Restatement distinguishes libel from slander, which
is defined as "the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory
gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsection

(1)."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 568(2).
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heard before a jury? The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently drew the line by articulating the test appearing
in the first quotation cited above. 2 If the published quote constitutes
a rational interpretation of the speaker's ambiguous words, or fails
to alter the substantive content of the speaker's nonambiguous words,
a public official/figure defendant in the Ninth Circuit will be able to
obtain summary judgment in the pretrial stage, because the author's
conduct fails to warrant an inference of actual malice.' As the second
quotation cited above indicates, however, there are those who believe
the holding in that case erects a bridge between the reporting of fact
and fiction.
This note will examine the issue of whether fabricated and altered
quotations warrant an inference of actual malice. After outlining a
brief history of libel law before and after New York Times v. Sullivan4,
an in-depth analysis of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine will be
undertaken. This analysis will scrutinize the Masson test as applied to
journalists who alter or fabricate direct quotations in an arguably
defamatory way. When an author chooses to interpret an event, it is
assumed that it is an event which lends itself to interpretation. Direct
quotations, however, convey the belief that the words as printed
accurately represent the speaker's words.' This makes the defamatory
impact of an altered or fabricated quotation even greater. This author
takes the position that the Masson test is inappropriate when applied
to direct quotations, and that such an application strikes an inappropriate balance between the competing interests of press freedom and
individual reputation 6. Following this analysis, suggestions for a more
2. The test enunciated in that quotation is the rational interpretation/substantive content test addressed in this note. The terms rational interpretation/substantive
content test and the Masson test will hereinafter be used interchangeably.
3. The actual malice standard enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), constitutionalized libel law by subjecting both state and federal laws
to first amendment scrutiny. The test, as defined in Sullivan and subsequent cases,
requires a public official/figure suing for libel, to establish as a part of his prima
facie case, that the defendant published the statement with "knowledge that it was
false, or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. See infra
notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("by using quotation marks the writer warrants that she
has interposed no editorial comment, has resolved no ambiguities, has added or
detracted nothing of substance.")
6. One of the primary goals of libel law is to protect the reputational interest.
The importance of reputation in our society is demonstrated by the fact that the
interest has taken on a quasi-Constitutional character. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
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objective and appropriate standard for evaluating altered and fabricated direct quotations will be advanced.
A.

ACTUAL MALICE AND BEYOND: PREVENTING MEDIA CHILL

The history of libel in the United States can best be characterized
as a balance between two interests which, for the most part, coexist
without conflict. The interests involved are the freedom to publish
information, and the freedom to cultivate and maintain an unblemished reputation. 7 Both are extremely important values in our society,
and arguably, both receive constitutional protection.8 Occasionally

however, the exercise of one of these interests leads to an infringement
of the other, and courts must then attempt to maintain an appropriate
balance between the two. Prior to Sullivan, the balance between these
rights favored reputation. 9 This was evidenced by the ease with which

a plaintiff could maintain a successful libel action. The constitutional
protections of actual malice were not yet in place, and authors whose
works defamed others were subjected to strict liability in most jurisdictions, depending on the statutory and common law of each state.10

7. See supra note 6, infra notes 8, 31-32 and accompanying text.
8. The freedom to publish information is uncontestably protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution, which states: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Reputational interests are arguably property, which is protected from governmental
deprivation by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (Where aperson's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake, liberty interests are implicated, and state
officials must therefore satisfy procedural due process requirements.); see also L.

FORER, A CHrrLLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF
PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 113 (1987) ("The law treats reputation

as a property right that is balanced against the First Amendment claims of the
author.") [hereinafter FORER]. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (Reputation
alone is not a constitutionally protected interest in the same vein as liberty or
property.). See generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964), and
Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891 (1984) ("Notwithstanding Paul v. Davis, the reputational interest always had and continues to receive
protection as a part of the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Although the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit infringement by the federal
and state governments, the fact that the reputational interest is protected at all
supports the author's argument that it is an important constitutional interest.
9. W. PROSSER, W. PAGE KEETON, ON TORTS § 113, at 804 (1984) (hereinafter
PROSSER]. See also M. Franklin and D. Bussel, The Plaintiff'sBurden In Defamation:
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 826-27 (1984) [hereinafter
Franklin and Bussell.
10. See PROSSER, supra note 9, § 113, at 804; see also A. Sheer and A.
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To establish liability against the journalist, the plaintiff was required
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that the defendant
2
published a defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff.
Depending on the nature of the statement, the plaintiff was often
required to prove damages proximately caused by the publication;
otherwise, damages were presumed by the court. 3 Once these elements

of the prima facie libel case were established, the court presumed that
the statement was false,

4

and the burden shifted to the defendant,

who could plead and prove valid defenses. 5 Truth was considered an
absolute bar to recovery 6 and could be established by a showing that
the publication was substantially true, meaning essentially that the
"gist" or "sting" of the words were true. 7
Zardkoohi, Is the Law of Defamation as it Relates to Public Officials and Public
Figures Economically Efficient?, reprinted in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 207-8 (E. Dennis & E. Noam, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Sheer and
Zardkoohi].
11. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 804. See also Sheer and Zardkoohi, supra note
10, at 208.
12. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 802.
13. At common law, damages were presumed in cases of defamation per se.
The four categories of publication constituting defamation per se, and therefore a
presumption of damages, are: 1) imputations of criminal conduct; 2) imputations of
a venereal or otherwise loathsome disease; 3) imputations of conduct, character, or
condition which would adversely affect his fitness to properly carry out his business,
trade, or profession; and 4) imputations of serious sexual misconduct. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570-4 (1977).
14. PROSSER, supra note 9, at

802.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581a (Truth); § 583 (Consent);
§§ 606-610 (Fair Comment); § 611 (Report of official proceeding or public meeting).
In addition, also included in the list of defenses were the absolute and qualified
privileges, discussed at infra note 16 . Finally, procedural defenses such as the statute
of limitations and lack of jurisdiction were available.

16. Additional absolute privileges included: 1) Immunity for publication of
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings; 2) Immunity for publication
of statements made in the course of legislative proceedings; 3) Executive privilege for
communications made in the discharge of their Constitutional duties; 4) Consent of
the plaintiff; 5) Political broadcasts, including campaign and other speeches and
communications; and 6) Interspousal tort immunity. Qualified privileges included: 1)
necessity to protect the publisher's legitimate interests; 2) necessity to protect the
legitimate interests of others; 3) furtherance of a common interest; and 4) communications to one who may act in the public interest. Qualified privileges could be defeated
by establishing that the privilege was abused. For a comprehensive discussion of
privileges and abuses, see PROSSER, supra note 9, §§ 113A-115, at 813-839.
17. PROSSER, supra note 9, §116, at 842. The rational interpretation/substantive
content test is a modern application of the "gist" or "sting" approach to falsity.
Although the test well serves the purposes of the first amendment in ordinary libel
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As is readily apparent from common law treatment of libel prior
to Sullivan, the balance between the interest in a free press and the
individual's reputation favored the latter.' From the burden of proof
awaiting a plaintiff to the presumptions of fault and falsity attributed
to the defendant and his statements, the press was unarguably in a
disfavored position during litigation. 9 Press freedom, however, was
not totally abandoned. Recognizing the value of a free and robust
press to a democratic society, 20 the courts adopted the aforementioned
defenses in an effort to maintain the balance, and prevent media selfcensorship, or "chill" as it is frequently called. 2' Notwithstanding
these efforts, it became evident that the press, faced with the threat
of increased damage awards 22 and an adversarial system which favored
23
the plaintiff, was being chilled from aggressively reporting the news.
In 1960 however, the libel landscape began a transformation that is
still unfolding today. 24
During that year, the New York Times published a full page
advertisement concerning the civil rights movement entitled "Heed
Their Rising Voices. "25 The advertisement contained statements alleging misconduct on the part of Montgomery, Alabama police officials
in connection with civil rights demonstrations by black students. In
addition, the article implied that the police were involved in the
bombing of Dr. Martin Luther King's home, and the wrongful
contexts, it is the author's position that such an approach is inappropriate when
applied to situations where a journalist alters or fabricates direct quotations prior to
publication. See infra notes 165-186 and accompanying text.
18. This is evidenced by the increasing burdens imposed on plaintiff as a result
of New York Times v. Sullivan and it's progeny. Also supporting this proposition is
the fact that plaintiffs win less than ten percent of all litigated defamation actions.
See Franklin and Bussel, supra note 9, at 825-827. See also infra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
19. See Franklin and Bussel, supra note 9, at 825-827. See also infra notes 3134 and accompanying text.
20. PRossER, supra note 9, §113, at 804-5.
21. Id. See generally FoRER, supra note 8, and S. Renas, C. Hartmann, and J.
Walker, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Chilling Effect: Are Newspapers Affected by
Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, reprinted in THE COST OF LIBEL: EcoNOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 40 (E. Dennis & E. Noam, eds. 1989).
22 H. Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards, InsurancePremiums and the Cost
of Media Libel Litigation, reprinted in THE COST OF LBEL: EcoNoMWc AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 1, 3-5 (E. Dennis & E. Noam, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Kaufman].
23. Id. at 1-2. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S.254, 277-78
(1964); FORER, supra note 8, at 17-18; Sheer and Zardkoohi, supra note 10, at 209.
24. Kaufman, supra note 22, at 1.
25. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-59 (1964).
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prosecution of Dr. King in an attempt to intimidate civil rights
activists. L. B. Sullivan, one of the Commissioners for the City of
Montgomery, brought a libel action against the New York Times,
alleging that the publication attributed official misconduct to him in
26
his capacity as Commissioner.
Under Alabama law at the time, defenses could not be alleged
by the defendant unless the truth of all facts supporting the defense
were proven. 27 Applied to the New York Times, the law required that
it prove the truth of all criticisms in the advertisement before a
privilege of "fair comment" would be sustained.2 Following trial,
the jury awarded the plaintiff $500,000.29 On appeal to the Alabama
Supreme Court, the verdict was sustained. 0 The defendant then
appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court alleging that
Alabama's libel standards were an unconstitutional violation of the
first amendment.
Faced with the issue of whether a state could enforce such a
restrictive law regarding the burden of proving defenses in actions for
libel, the United States Supreme Court articulated the actual malice
test. For the first time in our nation's history, the Supreme Court
established a constitutional privilege for reporters publishing information concerning public officials:3
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
32
disregard of whether it was false or not.
In so holding, the Supreme Court removed the defendant's
common law burden of proving truth as an affirmative defense, and
26. Id. at 258.

27. Id. at 256.

28. Id. For information regarding the privilege of fair comment, see supra

notes 15-16.

29. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).

30. Id.
31. R.

SMOLLA, SuING THE PRESS: LIBEL, TIE MEDIA, & POWER

27 (1986)

[hereinafter SMOLLA]. "Times v. Sullivan revolutionalized the American law of libel
because in one sudden burst of federal judicial power, state libel laws were made
subject to the strictures of the First Amendment, and, with that ruling, hundreds of
years of evolving state libel laws were rendered obsolete." Id. See also Franklin and
Bussel, supra note 9, at 826.
32. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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instead required that a plaintiff in such actions establish falsity as a

part of her prima facie case." Moreover, the plaintiff's burden of
proof was elevated from the much lower preponderance of the evidence to a standard of clear and convincing evidence.14 Therefore, in
addition to pleading defamation in accord with the laws of the forum
state, public officials after Sullivan were required to establish the

constitutional requirements of actual malice with clear and convincing
evidence. The test has proven to be a difficult standard to define and
apply,35 and many subsequent cases heard by the Court have dealt
36
with defining the test and determining to whom it is applicable.
What began as a test to protect publications concerning the
conduct of government officials soon increased in scope. In a pair of
cases decided in 1967, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
the protections of actual malice should extend to journalists who

published information concerning public figures rather than public

officials. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts," the plaintiff was a
football coach at a public university accused of conspiring to fix a
football game.38 Similarly, in Associated Press v. Walker,39 the plain-

tiff was a retired army general accused of leading a violent, anti-

desegregation demonstration at the University of Mississippi.4 In each
case, the Court held that the protections of actual malice would apply
33. "[Tihe plaintiff's prima facie case has become more complex and more
difficult to establish because he now bears the burden of proof on the issues of
falsity and fact." Franklin and Bussel, supra note 9, at 826.
34. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
35. See e.g., FORER, supra note 8, at 97-98:
[I]n a libel case, the trial judge must guess correctly on many legal issues in
which there are no definitive rulings from a majority of the Supreme Court
justices. In an ordinary libel case against a newspaper [citing Curran v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Del. Ct. Pa. 76-13449 (1976)], the transcript of
the charge of the trial judge to the jury was ninety-three pages ...

reading

at a normal pace and stopping, as I do, to look at the jurors to see if they
appear to understand or are perplexed and then repeat the difficult passage,
it would probably take three hours to deliver ... the court in that case
charged the jury on seventy-five issues of law ... it is unreasonable to
expect juries to remember and understand a charge of such length and
complexity.
Id.; see also Harte-Hanks Communication v. Connaughton, 105 L.Ed. 2d 562, 576
n.7 (1989) (discussing confusing nature of actual malice test and how judges can
better alleviate the confusion).
36. Infra notes 37-54, 60 and accompanying text.
37. Curtis Publishing Co., v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
38. Id. See also SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 54.
39. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

40. Id. See also SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 54.
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to publications concerning plaintiffs who are public figures .41
The rationale for creating this new classification included the

realization that, in the United States, the line separating public
officials and public figures is often blurred, and public figures are
often as responsible for shaping public opinion and policies as are
government officials .42 Actual malice was further complicated by
subsequent cases addressing matters of public concern 4 and private

figures." In addition to these numerous cases defining the scope of
the doctrine's applicability, much of the Court's subsequent analysis
dealt with defining the test itself.
In St. Amant v. Thompson4 5 the Court addressed the minimum

fault requirements under the actual malice test, and established several

examples of journalistic conduct which constitute reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of allegedly defamatory statements.4 Reckless
disregard for truth or falsity was not, the Court noted, measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published or investigated before publishing. 47 Rather, to establish reckless disregard, the
plaintiff must prove the publisher in fact entertained serious doubts
that the publication was true. 48 The Court recognized that the parameters of conduct constituting the entertainment of "serious doubts"
would have to be determined through case by case adjudication, but
believed that this was the best way to maintain a proper balance
49
between reputational and first amendment interests.
41. SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 54. See generally F. Schauer, Public Figures, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984); G. Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public
Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (1984).
42. SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 54.
43. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (extended actual
malice requirements to all plaintiffs whenever the published information was a matter
of public interest or concern). Considered the most expansive protection of first
amendment interests to date, the Rosenbloom Court was criticized for having
"emasculated the law of libel to the point where it was essentially powerless."
SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 57. The Rosenbloom ruling was soon limited in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
44. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limited Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (holding that states can regulate the fault
requirement which private figure plaintiffs must prove, provided that defendants not
be held strictly liable for the publications)); see supra note 43.
45. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
46. Id. at 732.
47. Id.at 731.
48. Id.
49. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("But to insure the
ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that
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The next major change enacted by the Court was to increase the
plaintiff's burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment. In
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.," the Court considered the issue of
whether the plaintiff, in arguing against a motion for summary
judgment, must prove actual malice under the same evidentiary standard as is required at trial.5' Therefore, the public official/public
figure plaintiff, in attempting to defeat a motion for summary judgment, must establish actual malice with clear and convincing evidence.12 The Anderson Court was careful, however, to ensure that all
traditional summary judgment standards were left unaffected by its
decision:
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.5
By enacting a much higher summary judgment standard than the
original standard of a preponderance of the evidence, Anderson
further decreased the public official/public figure's chances of making
54
their case before a jury.
the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.") Id.
at 732.
50. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
51. Id. at 254-55.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. These trends have reversed the common law balance between reputational
and press interests to now favor the latter. See Franklin and Bussel, supra note 9, at
826-27:
With the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of this area of the law,
however, the plaintiff has lost his favored position .... [tihe shoe is indeed
on the other foot. In light of the plaintiff's now disfavored position, it is
not surprising that plaintiffs win less than ten percent of the litigated
defamation suits.
Franklin and Bussel, supra note 9, at 826-27. See also Kaufman, supra note 22, at
6-7 (1989):
[AJII the available data indicate that more than 90 percent of seriously
litigated media libel cases never go to trial . . . .[a] more recent study of
motions to dismiss in libel actions brought by public official plaintiffs from
1976 to 1984 showed similar results: more than 60 percent were granted.
Moreover, approximately 75 percent of motions for summary judgment are
granted in favor of the libel defendant.
Kaufman, supra note 22, at 6-7.
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The actual malice standard allows journalists tremendous discretion in publishing information concerning public officials and public

figures. While much authority supports the high degree of protection
granted to journalists,5 5 this freedom has also been criticized by
numerous legal and journalistic scholars . 6 Some of the criticisms
center around the belief that the test does not truly insulate journalists
from libel suits." Others are based on the belief that such protection
actually discourages accurate reporting." Whatever the individual
observer's belief, one fact cannot be denied -New York Times v.

Sullivan has remade and will continue to remake the law of libel in

the United States. With every new case, the doctrine is fashioned and
adapted to meet each unique and unforeseen situation. This was the

55. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 31 (supporting the current standards for
libel suits); and FORER, supra note 8 (noting the threat to press freedom caused by
the current libel explosion).
56. See infra notes 58 & 181; see also W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment
Limitations on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson
Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793 (1985) (New York Times v. Sullivan
sometimes works to unfairly defeat meritorious claims, because plaintiffs cannot meet
the requisite standards of proof for actual malice.).
57. See Kaufman, supra note 22, at 15: "The major conclusion that must be
drawn from all of the hard economic realities outlined above can be briefly stated:
The more than twenty-year-old promise of constitutionally guaranteed protection
from the unduly chilling economic effects of libel claims remains today decidedly
unfulfilled." See also FoRER, supra note 8, at 18: "Countless libel cases are being
docketed in state and federal courts every day. The increase in libel litigation is
extraordinary and anomalous."; M. Nadel, Refining the Doctrine of New York Times
v. Sullivan, reprinted in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

157 (E. Dennis & E. Noam, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Nadel]: "Ironically, however,
Sullivan appears to have increased libel costs by indulging the instinct of the press to
engage in behavior which antagonizes potential plaintiffs, thereby encouraging them
to sue and thus to increase the costs of resolving libel complaints." Id.
58. See D. Hollander, The Economics of Libel Litigation, reprinted in THE
COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 257, 268-69 (E. Dennis and E.
Noam, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Hollander]:
The second major effect of certain of the protections is to decrease the
accuracy of the information. Use of the actual malice standard or absolute
privilege ... will reduce the incentive to use care below that which would
be used under strict liability. Similarly, restrictions on recoverable damages
will result in lower accuracy. The reduction in accuracy ... is clearly
undesirable, and constitutes the major disadvantage of using constitutional
privileges to subsidize the media.
Id. See also Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (Burger, C.J., and White, J., concurring in separate opinions, examine, inter
alia, the actual malice doctrine and its effect on accurate journalism.).
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prophecy of St. Amant v. Thompson,59 and history has proven it to
be true. Numerous courts have struggled with the analytical framework of Sullivan and its progeny.w It was with this framework and
historical basis in mind that the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether actual malice should be inferred when the alleged libel stems
from the publication of altered or fabricated quotations.
B. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE: WHEN ARE FACTS FICTION?

Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Masson, a psychoanalyst and former Projects
Director for the Sigmund Freud Archives, brought a diversity action
for libel and false light invasion of privacy 6' in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, against defendants Janet Malcolm, New Yorker Magazine, and Alfred A. Knopf
Publishing Co. 62 Malcolm, a staff writer for New Yorker Magazine,
contacted Masson to arrange interviews for the purpose of writing a
story about Masson's termination from his directorship at the Archives. 63 The two met on several occasions, and Malcolm compiled
numerous tapes containing conversations between them. 64 In 1983,
Malcolm published her two part article, which extensively quoted
Masson, in New Yorker magazine. 6 The article addressed the falling
out between Masson and two of the other board members at the
Archives and his subsequent termination from the position of Projects
Director. 66 The articles were later quoted verbatim in a book published

Id.

59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. FORER, supra note 8, at 17:
In more than sixty-seven cases dealing with freedom of speech and of the
press decided by the Supreme Court from 1964 to 1986, the law continually
has been rewritten. Each new decision has created more unprecedented and
complicated doctrines, rules, and distinctions that constitute hurdles for
both plaintiffs and defendants.

61. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1536. (9th Cir. 1989).
(This note does not address the false light claim, which is based on invasion of
privacy. However, the district court in Masson disposed of the false light claim under
the same actual malice standard). See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 686 F. Supp.
1396, 1397 (N. D. Cal. 1987).
62. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989).
63. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d
1535 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665).
64. Id. at 5.
65. See Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives, THE NEW
YORKER, Dec. 5, 1983 (Part I), and Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the
Archives, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 1983 (Part II).
66. Id.
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by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 67 Masson claimed that the article, specifically
the quotations, was defamatory and portrayed him in a false light. 61
To support the claim, he alleged that the published quotations were
not his words and that their fabrication constituted actual malice. 69
In the district court each defendant moved for summary judgment. 70 All three motions were granted by the court on the grounds
that Masson had failed to produce clear and convincing evidence
justifying a jury conclusion that the defendants published the quotations with actual malice. 71 Specifically, the court held that partial
fabrication or alteration of quotes prior to publication would not
warrant an inference of actual malice so long as the published version
was a rational interpretation of the original. 72 The district court then
concluded that Malcolm's article was a rational interpretation of
Masson's true words, and therefore granted her motion for summary
judgment. 73 Masson appealed, and the decision was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 74
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit adopted a portion of the district
court's analysis and concluded that, for purposes of summary judgment, actual malice would not be inferred when the published quotations were either a rational interpretation of the speaker's ambiguous
remarks, or failed to alter the substantive content of their unambiguous remarks. 75 The lengthy dissent attacked the court's reasoning
and application of precedent, 76 noting that the decision not only failed
to further the interests of the first amendment, 77 but created a
precedent which allowed journalists to place defamatory words into
a speaker's mouth in complete disregard of the subject's reputation. 71
To fully understand each side's arguments and analysis, the quotations
themselves must be examined in both their original and published
form.

1987).

67.
68.
69.
70.

See J. MALCOLM, IN THE FREuD ARCHIVES (1984).
See supra note 61, and accompanying text.
Id. See also infra notes 79-81, 103-104, 112, and accompanying text.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal.

71. Id.at 1407.

72. Id. at 1399-1407.

73. Id.

74. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. Id. at 1539.

76. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1548-70 (9th Cir. 1989
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 90-98, 155-164 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 1562. See also infra note 181 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 1550.
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1. The Masson interviews: Before and After
To fully understand the extent of the editorial license condoned
by the Ninth Circuit, some of the altered quotations should be
examined in both their pristine as well as their published form and
compared in light of the court's analysis. Therefore, two of the most
extreme examples of Malcolm's alterations are discussed below.
a.

Intellectual Gigolo

The intellectual gigolo quote best exemplifies the way in which the
court's analysis allows journalists to substitute their own words for
those actually spoken. The following quotation, attributed to Masson,
appeared in the article:
She [the graduate student] said, "[wiell, it is very nice
sleeping with you in your room, but you are the kind of person
who should never leave the room- you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own
room." You know, in their way, if not in so many words,
Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me
well enough "in my own room." They loved to hear what
creeps and dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo
- you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him
out in public.7 9

The portion of the quote dealing with the graduate student's comments
was not in Malcolm's recorded transcripts because they occurred
much earlier in a completely different discussion between Malcolm
and Masson. 0 The quote dealing with Dr. Eissler's and Anna Freud's
opinions of him was in Malcolm's transcripts, but appeared in the
following way:
[Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I was a private asset
and a public liability. They like me when I was alone in their
living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth
about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a
sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for
these important training analysts to be caught dead with me.',
79. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Brief for Appellant at 29, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535
(9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2665).

81. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989).
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The Court's Perspective

In evaluating this alteration, the Ninth Circuit accepted the
district court's conclusion that the statement was a rational interpretation of Masson's ambiguous language.8 2 The court further reasoned
that, based on other portions of the tape where Masson had discussed
events with language that could be construed as sexual,8 3 the substitution of "intellectual gigolo" for "private asset and a public liability," did not alter the substantive content of Masson's self description
and was therefore not supportive of defamation under the actual
malice standard.84 Specifically, numerous statements which the court
held to be "substantive equivalent[s] of ... gigolo" appeared
throughout the article, outweighing Masson's "simple, albeit vehement denial" that he ever used the phrase intellectual gigolo. 8 Finally,
the court accepted the district court's characterization of the term
intellectual gigolo, which was interpreted to mean that Masson's views
were privately entertaining yet publicly embarassing.86
Aside from their application of the term intellectual gigolo to the
substantive content prong of the test, the court further noted that this
was not a true example of a journalist attributing a defamatory "self
assessment" to a subject, but was rather, the publication of Dr.
Eissler and Anna Freud's opinions of Masson, which at the time was
nonactionable in American libel law. 7 Finally, the court applied the
"incremental harm branch" of the "libel proof doctrine" 88 to rule
that, in light of the "provocative, bombastic statements" made by
Masson during the recorded interviews, the defamatory impact of the

82. Id.at 1541.
83. Specifically, the court refers to Masson's quotes concerning "Suck stories,"
or stories about how other junior psychoanalysts "suck up" to the senior analysts in
the field in order to further their own careers. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895
F.2d 1535, 1540, n. 4 (9th Cir. 1989).
84. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 1540, n. 4.
86. Id. at 1541.

87. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). See
generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (opinion is protected
under the first amendment); But see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S.Ct 2695
(1990) (Qualifying Gertz by holding that all opinion is not protected under the first
amendment).
88. The incremental harm branch of the libel-proof doctrine tests the defamatory impact of the publication. If the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff's reputation
is determined to be de minimis, the publication is deemed nonactionable. See Herbert
v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310-11 (2nd Cir. 1986).
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fictionalized quotations was lessened to the point where Masson was
essentially libel-proof.8 9
The Dissent: A Different Characterization
The dissent noted the damning impact that the use of intellectual
gigolo was likely to have on the reader, 9° and concluded that a fair
reading of the phrase would lead the reader to believe that Masson
was the type of person who "forsakes intellectual integrity in exchange
for pecuniary or other gain." 9' Furthermore, the majority took the
most "benign interpretation of gigolo" available, thereby giving
92
Malcolm every possible benefit of the doubt. It was also noted that
the majority interpretation of gigolo actually contradicted Malcolm's,
which was determined through depositions to be the selling of sexual
favors. 93 For the dissent, the conclusion was clear: "For an academic
to refer to himself as an intellectual gigolo is such a devastating
admission of professional dishonesty that a jury could well conclude
that it is libellous." 94
The dissent then attacked the other elements of the majority's
reasoning, first noting that the opinion placed the Ninth Circuit in
direct opposition with both the D.C. Circuit and the California
Supreme Court by "breathing life" into the "stillborn" libel proof
doctrine. 95 In addition, the majority's conclusion that Masson's denial
was insufficient to outweigh the sexual connotations actually made
was characterized as a "swearing contest between reporter and sub96
ject," where "the reporter always wins." Furthermore, by using a
rationale characterized as "explosive,'"' the dissent noted that "if

2.)

89. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 1551 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1551-52 n.6 (9th Cir.
1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1557.
95. The dissent concluded that the majority fundamentally misread Herbert,
which avoided a holding similar to that applied by the majority. In addition, the
dissent noted that the majority was attempting to graft the doctrine onto California
libel law, in direct contradiction to the conclusion in Baker v. 'Los Angeles Herald
Examiner. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1565-66 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citing Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254 (1986) (rejecting the
doctrine)). Moreover, the dissent noted that the doctrine has never been accepted in
any federal appellate court. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535,
1565-66 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1552 n. 7.
97. Id. at 1550.
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you make statements that could reasonably be characterized as boastful or arrogant (or callous or stupid or reflecting any other trait of
character or intellect) the reporter may attribute to you any other
statement reflecting that same trait." 9 The intellectual gigolo quote
is but one example of the court's application of the test. Perhaps a
better example is presented by the court's treatment of the quotation
"[hie had the wrong man." 99
b.

He Had The Wrong Man

Masson's claim was further supported through Malcolm's depiction of a discussion between him and Dr. Eissler.1°° Masson had
learned that Sigmund Freud suppressed information which discounted
his seduction theory.' 0' After learning that his position at the Archives
had been terminated, Masson discussed with Dr. Eissler his plans to
publicly announce his discoveries concerning Freud.1°2 Malcolm's
article, in reporting Masson's recollection of that discussion, attributed to him the following quotation:
[Eissler] ... was always putting moral pressure on me [to
keep silent about my discoveries about Freud]. "Do you want
to poison Anna Freud's last days? Have you no heart? You're
going to kill the poor old woman." "I said to him, "What
have I done? You're doing it. You're firing me. What am I
suppposed to do, be grateful to you?" "You could be silent
about it. You could swallow it. I know it is painful for you.
But you could just live with it in silence." "Why should I do
that?" "Because it is the honorable thing to do." Well, he

had the wrong man.

103

The taped interview, however, offers a very different version, and
sheds light on the true meaning of Masson's statement:
[Eissler] ... was constantly putting various kinds of moral
pressure on me, and "Do you want to poison Anna Freud's
last days" "Have you no heart?" He called me up, "Have
you no heart? Think of what she's done for you, and you are
now willing to do this to her." I said, "What am I, What
98. Id.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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have I done? You're doing it, you're firing me. What am I
supposed to do, thank you? Be grateful to you?" He said,
"Well, you could never talk about it, you could be silent
about it, you could swallow it. I know it's painful for you,
but just live with it in silence." "F[---] you," I said, "Why
should I do that Why? You know, why should one do that?"
"Because it's the honorable thing to do, and you will save
face, and who knows, if you never speak about it and quietly
and humbly accept our judgment, who knows in a few years
1°4
if we don't bring you back?" Well, he had the wrong man.
The majority upheld the deletion under the rational interpretation
05
prong of the test. Applying Time v. Pape,1 which controls cases
involving quotations that are alleged to have been "misleadingly
edited, ' ' °6 the court concluded: "It is unclear whether [Masson] was
declaring that he was the 'wrong man' to keep silent for selfish
07
'
purposes, or the 'wrong man' to ask to do something honorable."'
Given this linguistic ambiguity, the court held that the language chosen
by Malcolm was a rational interpretation of Masson's statements, and
therefore failed to support an inference of actual malice.1°s The dissent
however, accepted Masson's contention that the deleted portion
changed the true meaning of his words."°9 Remarking that the major0 the dissent concluded:
ity's rationale had "no meaningful bounds,"
[Malcolm] deleted 33 words out of a 40 word sentence, utterly
changing Masson's meaning so as to make him say the antith[T]he contrast between the
esis of what he actually said ....
two statements could not be sharper. As reported by Malcolm,
Masson portrays himself as a swine, boasting that he would
never be swayed to do the right and honorable thing. Masson's
unedited statement makes him sound more like a hero, someone willing to speak the unpleasant truth even if it damages
his career .... "
104. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis in original).
105. Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
106. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1544-45 (9th Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 1546.
108. Id.
109. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1554.
111. Id. at 1553-54.
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Additionally, there were several other examples of fabricated
quotes appearing in Malcolm's articles." 2 In each instance, the court
refused to find that the misquotation constituted clear and convincing
evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Malcolm
in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of the quotations
attributed to Masson." 3 The court's basis for so holding was that, in
each instance, the published quotations either: 1) were rational interpretations of ambiguous statements made by Masson; or 2) failed to
alter the substantive content of non-ambiguous remarks made by
him. 114 The Ninth Circuit tailored this test from two earlier libel
decisions: one in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals," 5 and the
other from the United States Supreme Court." 6
2.

The Test: Its Origins And Applications
The first part of the Masson test states that actual malice will
not be inferred from fabricated quotations, provided that the quote
is a rational interpretation of the speaker's ambiguous remarks.' '7
This language was first articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Time v. Pape."' In Pape, the Court was faced with a
situation where the publisher printed a story concerning racially
motivated police brutality, based in part upon a United States Civil
Rights Commision report which contained allegations from one victim's complaint."19 Although the Commission's report was careful to
qualify its account of the victim's story concerning Officer Pape's
"alleged" acts of brutality, Time was not as careful. 20 The word
"alleged" was ommitted in its version, and as a result, the article
suggested that the unproven allegation of brutality was true. 12' How112. There were eight counts briefed and argued by Masson before the ninth
circuit. The two most extreme examples are presented in this article. Regarding the
other counts, see "It Sounded Better," id. at 1539-40; "Greatest Analyst who ever
lived," id. at 1542;"The Schreber case," id. at 1543; "Don't know why I put it in,"
id. at 1542; "Denise worries too much," id. at 1544; and "Sex, Women, Fun," id.
at 1542.
113. Id. at 1539-44.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 1538. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1977).
116. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1544-45 (9th Cir. 1989).
See Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). See also Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3rd Cir. 1987).
117. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d at 1539.
118. Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
119. Id. at 281-83.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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ever, the Supreme Court denied relief, finding that ommission of the
word "alleged" was not sufficient to establish actual malice, given
1 and that the
that the document was "bristling with ambiguity,"'
journalist's account was a "rational interpretation" of that document. 123
The Time standard was also applied in Dunn v. Gannett New
York Newspapers,'2 which was somewhat closer to the facts in
Masson than Time v. Pape. 25 In Dunn, the Mayor of Elizabethtown,
New Jersey was quoted in a Spanish newspaper as calling the Hispanics
'
of Elizabethtown "cerdos," meaning "pigs. "126 In fact, the Mayor
had been criticizing the litter problem in the Hispanic community. In
''
so doing he called the community's Hispanics "litterbugs. "27 There
1' 28
is, however, no direct Spanish translation for the word "litterbug.'
1 29 The
The closest translation available to the publisher was "cerdos."
Third Circuit ruled that the use of the word "cerdos" did not alter
the substantive content of "litterbug" since it was a fair, albeit
inadequate, translation and was therefore a rational interpretation of
30
Mayor Dunn's ambiguous remarks.
The second portion of the Masson test states that actual malice
will not be inferred when the published quotations do not alter the
3
substantive content of the plaintiff's actual remarks.' ' Although the
122. Id. at 290. The Court stated:

Time's ommission of the word "alleged" amounted to the adoption of one
of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled
with ambiguities .... To permit the malice issue to go to the jury because
of the ommision of a word like "alleged", despite the context of that word
in the Commission Report and the external evidence of the Report's overall

Id.

meaning, would be to impose a much stricter standard of liability on errors
of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact.
123. Id. Time v. Pape is overwhelmingly distinguishable from the facts in

Masson. In Pape, the omission of one word from a government document was held
insufficient for establishing actual malice. Masson's case however, was supported

with eleven independent examples of altered quotations. Many of the alterations were
blatant, (e.g., "He had the wrong man"), and are to that extent very different from
Pape.

124. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3rd Cir. 1987).
125. To the extent that Dunn addressed the interpretation of a verbal interview

rather than a printed document, it more closely resembles the facts in Masson.

Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446, at 447.
Id.
Id.at 451.
Id.
130. Id. at 452.
126.
127.
128.
129.

131. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir.
1989).
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substantive content prong of the test seems to have its roots in the
common law notion of substantial truth,'32 the Ninth Circuit cited as
33
authority Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche.1
Hotchner concerned the publication of a book of Ernest Hemingway memoirs entitled Hemingway in Spain. 3 4 Both the author of

the text as well as the publisher of the English translation were sued
1 In
for printing allegedly defamatory statements about Hotchner. 35
attempting to establish actual malice, the plaintiff argued that the
publisher fabricated the defamatory Hemingway quotations. Specifically, the publisher took the following passage from the original:
"[Hotchner is] dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's something phony
about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room as him,"'13 6 and toned
it down to simply read, "I don't trust him.' ' 13 7

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendants
had to some extent fictionalized the quotations. 38 Nevertheless, because the translation actually weakened the defamatory impact of the
passage and did not alter the substantive content of Hemingway's
criticisms of Hotchner, his claim that the alteration sufficed to support
an inference of actual malice was denied. 39
The majority in Masson characterized the holding in Hotchner
as authority for the proposition that quotations may be fictionalized
"to some extent."' 140 Locating a proper place to draw the line between
fictionalized quotations falling within the "some extent" category
identified in Dunn, and that category justifying an inference of actual
malice, posed little problem for the Ninth Circuit. The result was the
adoption of the substantive content prong of the Masson test, to be
applied to situations where the speaker's true words were non-ambiguous. This portion of the test allows journalists to interpret the
speaker's language even when the original version is clear in its
meaning. The final federal case cited by the majority as authority for
its adoption of the rational interpretation/substantive content test is
Carson v. Allied News a Seventh Circuit case addressing completely
fabricated quotations as a source of inferring actual malice. "4'
132. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1977).
Id.at 911.
Id.
Id.at 914.

137. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2nd Cir. 1977).

138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989).
141. Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
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In Carson, the defendants published alleged conversations between NBC executives and entertainer Johnny Carson, depicting an
argument between them over Carson's move of The Tonight Show
from New York to California. 142 Additionally, the article reported
that the sole reason for Carson's move was to be closer to his mistress,
Joanna Holland. 43 Carson testified in depositions that there was no
power struggle between him and NBC executives and that the published conversations between them were fabricated.'" The defendant,
conversation was a "logical
in deposition, stated that the reported ' 45
on.'
gone
extension of what must have
A unanimous court found that the fabricated quotations of the
non-existent conversation between NBC and Johnny Carson formed
a sufficient basis for plaintiff's claim of actual malice.'" Citing St.
Amant v. Thompson, 47 the court reasoned:
In the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists, right next
to plagiarism, which parts of the National Insider article seem
to be, must be a canon that a journalist does not invent
quotations and attribute them to actual persons. If a writer
can sit down in the quiet of his cubicle and create conversations
as 'a logical extension of what must have gone on' and dispense
this as news, it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment

protection such fiction can claim .148

The Masson court concluded that Carson stood for the proposition that only complete fabrications warrant an inference of actual
malice. 49 Masson was therefore distinguished from Carson on the
grounds that Malcolm only partially fabricated Masson's quotations. 150 Under the rationale of Dunn, such a partial fabrication is
allowable.'' By drawing on Time v. Pape, Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, and Carson v. Allied
News, the Masson Court read the law to require a two-part inquiry.
First, whenever a journalist completely fabricates quotations, under
142. Id. at 208.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 212.

145. Id.
146. Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976).
147. See supra notes 45-48, and accompanying text.
148. Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976).
149. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 126-130; see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895
F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Carson an inference of actual malice is warranted. 5 2 If the quotations
are not complete fabrications, then the rational interpretation/substantive content test must be applied.' 53 Because Malcolm's quotations
were not completely fictionalized, they were scrutinized under this
test, and were determined to not constitute sufficient grounds for an
54
inference of actual malice.

3. The Dissent: Problems with the Majority's Application of
Precedent.
The dissent on the other hand, took the position that fabrications
of Malcolm's magnitude were complete fabrications, and that each
case cited by the majority was either clearly distinguishable or actually
supported Masson's claim." Beginning with Time v. Pape, the dissent
argued that the rational interpretation test applied in that case was
inapplicable to Masson. While Pape allowed interpretation of a
document that bristled with ambiguity, the claim of actual malice was
not based on the alteration of direct quotations. A unique defamatory
impact is created when the defamation appears to come from the
speaker's own mouth. 5 6 Moreover, there is little need for interpretation when both the reporter and speaker are English, and the material
is published as direct quotations. 57

That there should be no substantive interpretation when an
English subject is quoting an English speaker was also one of the
dissent's lines of approach to Dunn , Hotchner, and the substantive
content prong of the Masson test. Although the Second Circuit in
that case did apply the Time v. Pape rational interpretation test to
altered or fabricated quotations, the journalist in that case was faced
with translating an English speaker's words into spanish, when there
was no direct interpretation available. The journalist in Dunn did not
purport to interpret the words of Mayor Dunn, but was instead
seeking an appropriate translation for the word "litterbug." This was
but one of the dissent's criticisms of the majority's reliance on Dunn.
Another was the fact that, to the extent Dunn allowed the
admission of collateral evidence to further support the plaintiff's
152. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
155. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1554, 1557 (9th Cir.
1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1549.
157. Id.
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claim of actual malice, it directly supported Masson. 5 In Masson,
there was present what was characterized as a "mountain of counter9
vailing factual evidence" supporting the claim of actual malice."
Nevertheless, this collateral evidence carried little weight with the
majority. Under the rational interpretation prong of the Masson test,
journalists now reserve the right to interpret a subject's language prior
to its publication as verbatim quotations, as long as their subject's
words can be characterized as ambiguous and their interpretation
construed as rational. And if the words cannot be characterized as
ambiguous, the journalist may still interpret the direct quotation as
long as the substantive content remains intact.
The dissent also argued that Hotchner failed to support the
majority's position in Masson, and that to the extent it was applicable
at all, it supported the plaintiff. 60 Hotchner presented a completely
different problem, because the altered quotations lessened the defamatory impact of Hemingway's criticisms of Hotchner. In Masson
however, the altered quotations not only increased the defamatory
impact of the words, but the fact that they were published as direct
158. Id. at 1555.
159. There was present in Masson, as noted by Judge Kozinski, a:
Mountain of "countervailing factual evidence" tending to show malice:
assurances Malcolm allegedly gave Masson that all quotes would be verbatim; the existence of tape recordings for many of the conversations; that
Masson had advised The New Yorker's fact-checkers that he was being
misquoted; evidence that at least one of the quotations was changed,
apparently in Malcolm's handwriting, to make it more bombastic but less
accurate.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1555 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
160. The dissent noted that:
Hotchner, however, is relevant and, like Dunn, helps Masson. It provides a
fair and reasonable standard for evaluating a publisher's responsibility for
[Tihe court held that Doubleday could not
defamatory quotations ....
have been reckless as to the accuracy of the passage in question because (1)
the incident was believable; (2) the passage sounded like Hemingway; (3)
there were no convincing indicia of unreliability; and (4) the passage was
the third and fourth of these
incapable of independent verification ....
factors cut very sharply against the defendants in this case .... With tapes

in hand and fact-checkers alerted to Masson's protestations that he had
been misquoted, defendants had the means for verifying the accuracy of the
quotations and the "convincing indicia of unreliability" that should have
prompted them to do so. Applying Hotchner to this case leads precisely to
the opposite conclusion from that reached by the majority.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1556 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
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quotations made them appear to come from Masson's own mouth,
adding a unique dimension to his reputational harm. 61 As the dissent
further noted, Masson's denial of ever making the statements at issue
brought the case directly within Carson.162 Additionally, the majority
was criticized for drawing "minute distinctions" in order to appear
consistent with the other circuits addressing this issue:

63

If Carson does not cover a situation where the journalist
invents a conversation that never took place and reports words
that the subject never uttered, I am not sure exactly what it
does cover ....

Despite the majority's attempt to close ranks

with our sister circuits, today's decision stands in conflict with
that of every other circuit that has addressed the issue. 64
Clearly, the majority's reliance on precedent in Masson can be called
into question. As the dissent established, each of these cases can be
turned to support Masson's claim. The following section of this note
addresses the problematic nature of the rational interpretation/substantive content test as applied to journalists who alter or fabricate
direct quotations.
4.

Criticism's of the Test
To the extent that spoken words may be classified as an event,
failure to characterize them as they actually occurred constitutes
fictionalization which, under the Carson standard, warrants an inference of actual malice. In attempting to draw the line between a
protected and an actionable alteration or fabrication of a directly
quoted speaker, the Masson court applied a standard that this author
believes is inappropriate and problematic.
Several problems are posed by the Masson standard. One of the
most readily observable is the tremendous leeway which journalists
now have to edit and insert into quotations their own thoughts and
ideas.'" What they are doing in essence, is placing words into the
mouths of quoted speakers' 66 where such action is unwarranted.
A second problem is that both the rational interpretation and
substantive content prongs of the test are predicated upon a judicial
161. Id. at 1549-50.
162. Id. at 1556.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1553 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
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determination of whether the quoted language in its original form is
ambiguous. To the extent that every word in the English language is
capable of having at least two or three different definitions, and
sometimes as many as seven or eight, 67 language that could not
reasonably be held to be ambiguous is difficult to envision. Thus, it
would seem that virtually any quotation, under the Masson standard,
may be altered prior to publication. Accordingly, the value of an
individual's right to reputation, as well as the utility of quotations
and the faith the reader places in them have been severely weakened
6
by the holding in Masson.'1
In addition, the test itself contradicts standards traditionally
applied by courts in motions for summary judgment. 69 In ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, courts are expected to construe the
factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to
determine if the record presents a factual dispute upon which a jury
could reasonably conclude in the nonmoving party's favor. 70 If the
record supports such a determination, then summary judgment is to
be denied;' 71 conversely, should the court conclude that there is no
material issue of fact, summary judgment should be granted. 71 Under
the Masson test, however, courts are allowed to comb the record and
make arguments concerning whether the quoted language was ambiguous, and whether or not the language was a "rational interpretation"
or "altered the substantive content" of those remarks.
Perhaps the best example of this is illustrated by the majority's
treatment of Masson's statement "he had the wrong man.' 17 3 Whether
the language actually used by Masson in that passage was ambiguous
in meaning should have been construed as a question for the factfinder. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the passage was ambiguous as a matter of law and application of its test quickly disposed
167. Virtually any dictionary entry makes this point clear. For example, the
definition of false is: "1. not true; incorrect; wrong 2. untruthful; lying 3. unfaithful
4. misleading 5. not real, artificial." Likewise, the definition of true is: "1. faithful;
loyal 2. in accordance with fact; not false 3. conforming to standard, etc., correct 4.
rightful; lawful 5. accurately fitted, shaped, etc. 6. real; genuine." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMuIcAN LANGUAGE 221, 641 (Warner Books Paperback
Ed. 1984).
168. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1554, 1570 (9th Cir.
1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
169. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
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of the issue. 74 The court's treatment of that quote seems difficult to
reconcile with the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., requirement that
all factual determinations be construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.'7
Although the court payed lipservice to traditional summary judgment standards by stating that the evidence was construed against
Malcolm, 176 other areas of their analysis indicate that they did the
opposite. 177 For example, by adopting what the dissent characterized
as the most benign interpretation of "gigolo" available 7 s and in
accepting Malcolm's use of that word over Masson's "vehement
denial,' ' 7 9 the court appeared to construe the evidence in Malcolm's
favor. Perhaps this is a problem inherent in the Masson test. By
requiring judicial determinations of ambiguity, followed by conclusions as to whether the published version of quotations were either
rational interpretations or failed to alter the substantive content of
the original, the Masson test allows courts to interpret the record in
the light most favorable to the journalist in ruling on summary
judgment motions. Such an outcome inherently conflicts with the
function of the jury as factfinder, as well as the Supreme Court's
mandate in Anderson that traditional principles of summary judgment
be maintained. 80
The Ninth Circuit's approach strikes the balance between the
competing interests of reputation and press freedom much too far in
favor of the interest in freedom of the press. The irony of this
determination is apparent in the fact that many journalists themselves
recognize the alteration of quotations to be highly unethical and not
at all supportive of any First Amendment values.' 8' Although the

174. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
176. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1550-58.
178. Id. at 1551-52.
179. Id. at 1552 n. 7.
180. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.

181. For example, TxE

ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL

states:

Never alter quotations even to correct minor grammatical errors or word
usage. Casual minor tongue slips may be removed by using ellipses but even
then that should be done with extreme caution. If there is a question about
a quote, either don't use it or ask the speaker to clarify ....
...[quotation marks] surround the exact words of a speaker or writer
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Supreme Court recently rejected application of professional journalistic standards when adjudicating libel actions,' 2 to the extent that
the protections of actual malice were enacted to protect and prevent
the media from engaging in self- censorship,8 3 there is merit in
comparing the Masson test to the purposes of actual malice. Through
such a comparison the utility of the test can be discerned.
It is difficult to imagine any degree of "chill" or self-censorship
that would arise from application of a standard different from that
articulated in Masson. Just as fabricating or altering direct quotations
prior to publication constitutes poor journalism, legal standards which
support journalists in such endeavors constitute poor law. Given the
significant threat to reputation posed by Masson,'84 and the minute
effect its holding will have on first-amendment values, 8 5 the Masson
test is inappropriate for determining whether actual malice should be
inferred from evidence that defamatory quotations have been fabricated. There are, however, available alternatives that would appear
to strike a more appropriate balance between individual reputations
and the values of the First Amendment.
D.

SUGGESTIONS

This section presents possible alternatives to the Masson standard
for ruling on motions for summary judgment in a public official/
public figure libel suit based upon the alteration or fabrication of
quotations. Because much of this note adopts the approach of the
dissent in that case, Judge Kozinski's proposed test is presented first.
This test would consist of an application by the court of the following
five part inquiry:
(1) Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim
repetition of what the speaker said?
when reported in a story.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

STYLEBOOK A"

LIBEL MANUAL 176, 273 (C. French and N.

Goldstein, Eds., 1988.). To the extent that the journalism profession discourages
such practices, the first amendment does not seem furthered by a standard which
allows or even encourages it. See also J. HULTENO, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES:
ETncAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1985); Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558-62.

182. Harte-Hanks Communication, v Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989)
(affirming lower court's application of actual malice standard, but discussing the
inappropriateness of applying a professional standards rule).
183. See supra notes 20-24, 31-32 and accompanying text.
184. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
185. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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(2) If so, is it inaccurate?

(3) If so, is the inaccuracy material?
(4) If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
(5) If so, is the inaccuracy the result of malice, i.e., is it a
fabrication or was it committed in reckless disregard of the
truth? If the answer to any of these questions is no as a matter
of law, the inquiry stops and the defendant wins. If they could
86
all be answered yes, I would send the matter to the jury.'
Such an inquiry would be less burdensome for the libel plaintiff
trying to escape an unfavorable summary judgment. It would tip the
balance more in favor of reputation, and is a more objective test
because it is not predicated on a judicial determination of whether
the quoted plaintiff's language was ambiguous. Nor does this test
appear to allow a court to subjectively apply the most benign interpretation of language available, in order to justify granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Such determinations of
ambiguity and interpretations of language are appropriately left for
the factfinder. In a jury trial, a judge making such determinations
not only treads on the jury's function, but also violates traditional
standards for summary judgment in violation of Anderson.
The history of libel has illustrated the fact that no test is without
its limitations. However, the fact that Judge Kozinski's five-step
inquiry would better serve both the interests of reputation (by discouraging the alteration and fabrication of quotations) and freedom
of the press (by not legitimizing the use of fabricated or altered
quotations, thereby perpetuating ethical journalism) makes it a more
appealing standard than that enunciated in Masson.
Another alternative would be to simply allow an inference of
actual malice in this situation, and allow the issue of meaning to go
to the jury. This would essentially be a tailoring of Carson to the
situation where the quote is not completely a product of the journalist's imagination, but is fabricated in the sense that it is not a true
account of the speaker's actual words. Perhaps to the extent that
defamation, by definition, requires an interpretation of language
87
which lowers the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the community,'
the jury should be the entity to interpret the statements and determine
whether or not the alterations are serious enough to establish reckless
disregard as to their truth or falsity. Furthermore, for the reasons
186. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1562-66 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
187. See definition of libel, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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outlined above, the likelihood that this approach will "chill"
media is slight at best.
E.

the

CONCLUSION

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once remarked, "A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum' 188
stances and the time in which it is used.'
When a subject's words are published in an article as verbatim
quotations, they are presented to the reader as the true and unadulterated words of the speaker. They have not been interpreted, because
any interpretation necessary will be carried out by the reader. To that
extent, words encircled with quotation marks are crystal. It is therefore
necessary that courts treat them as crystal for purposes of inferring
actual malice at the summary judgment stage.
This note has examined Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, and
the rational interpretation/substantive content test enunciated therein.
It has analyzed the decision, the precedent on which the case was
based, and the value of the test in furthering both the values of
reputation and free press. By examining Masson, it was noted that
the standard will result in inconsistent caselaw, as judges apply their
own attitudes and biases when determining whether a plaintiff's
language was originally ambiguous, and in applying the proper prong
of the test. Overall, the standard, as applied to such situations, strikes
an improvident balance between the interests of reputation and press
freedom. Nevertheless, in the Ninth Circuit, it is the controlling
standard. While other jurisdictions disagree, the United States Supreme Court has not yet examined the issue.
Eventually the Court will decide it, be it through Masson, or a
subsequent case where an unfortunate plaintiff has sustained damages
as the result of published quotations that were attributed to him, yet
never spoken. When the issue is ultimately resolved, the crystalline
nature of verbatim quotations will hopefully be affirmed, with a more
appropriate balance being struck between the first amendment guarantee of a free press, and the individual's right to an unblemished
reputation. To allow such a bridge between fact and fiction poses a
serious threat to the journalistic profession, and allows unmeasurable
harm to be inflicted upon the reputations of individuals.
MARK

188. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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